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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Structural fallacies 
The Russian presidential elections have reached their seemingly inevitable 
conclusion, i.e. Putin won a landslide election, which was, well, unattractive as 
democratic elections go. Various governments, including the U.S. via Colin 
Powell’s and Ambassador Vershbow’s critiques, worried publicly about Russia’s 
anti-democratic electoral processes and authoritarian slide. 
 
With the presidential campaign finished however, the outline of the next step in 
the process gradually becomes clearer: constitutional reform. The surprise thus 
far is whence, and why, the call for constitutional change. First out of the gate in 
this race for reform was a representative of the fettered media, an ink-stained 
wretch who, having observed the absurdities of the campaign (Zhirinovsky’s 
bodyguard as a candidate?), exhorted his readers to vote anyway and supported 
Putin’s presidency for stability’s sake, then turned his eye to the "ugly" electoral 
procedures and found himself face-to-face with the "structural fallacies of our 
political system." (1) 
 
Rather than rail about Putin’s "authoritarianism," the author, Aleksandr Tsipko, 
focuses on the need for choice in a democratic system. Russia "lacks a political 
system as a set of rules or tough criteria for promotion and personnel selection." 
(2) Monthly polls may list the "Top 100" most influential figures in Russian 
political life, but on what is that power rating based, if an obscure KGB officer can 
be plucked from St. Petersburg to become the successor to the first Russian 
President? Or if a perpetual second or third banana gets tapped to lead the 
government in a new era of reform? 
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Where are the legislative and gubernatorial leaders who demonstrate the 
potential and willingness to do the work necessary for a genuine opposition, 
absent the power of a protest vote? Previous Russian elections brought 
"alternatives" to the leading contender, but those alternatives represented a 
protest over policies or personal foibles of the leader. Now however, "the energy 
of protest has been exhausted." (3) Absent the demand for or supply of a true 
alternative, absent the protest of true dissatisfaction, the electorate accepts 
stability and security as ends unto themselves. The system is not required to 
produce viable alternative leaders, and therefore produces no qualifying 
standards by which to judge those who step onto the political stage. Glazyev is 
Kharitonov is Zhirinovsky is his bodyguard. 
 
The power of personnel is still visible in patronage chains. Everyone who is 
anyone has one. Putin’s seems to be drawn primarily from the Siloviki, and thus 
his regime is characterized by the harder edge of their secretive, often thuggish 
ways, which we find easy to attack for the real and potential abuses of civil rights 
and individual freedoms. Travel back up that patronage chain that brought him to 
power however and you find some of the leading lights of Russia’s democratic 
awakening — his vaunted mentor Anatoli Sobchak, for example, or the man so 
welcomed in the West, Anatoli Chubais. Putin appears as the link between the 
so-called democratic reformers and the old KGB. But then again, there were 
always those who believed the KGB was at the forefront of the Soviet reform 
movement. 
 
Putin, whoever he was, is President because of the capricious whims of the 
ruling elite of the Yel’tsin era, not because of his well-developed plans for 
national education reform or for his plan to rescue the ruble. Capricious may be a 
bit unfair. It was not fanciful that Putin was selected; he had a job to do. With the 
life and treasure of most of the Yel’tsin "Family" now protected, what will he do 
next? 
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Putin’s decision to toss his government just before the election is more than 
arrogance; it is the recognition that his policies weren’t the real issue in the 
campaign, which may embolden him to become something else entirely. 
According to Tsipko, Putin is eager to finish the work of Gaidar and dismantle the 
"social sphere inherited from the Soviet Union." (4) What label will we find for him 
if he finally succeeds in an equitable distribution of land rights? Or closes the coal 
mines? Or stabilizes the ruble? How will those who ignored policy for strength 
and stability react? Perhaps more importantly, will Tsipko still be around to write 
about it? 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) "Something should be done about the constitution," Aleksandr Tsipko in 
Komsomolskaya pravda, 18 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
New details emerge in Yanderbiyev assassination 
On 18 February, five days after the murder of former Chechen President 
Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev, Qatari authorities arrested three Russians on suspicion 
of having carried out the killing. (1) One of the three was released because he 
held a diplomatic passport, but the remaining two men, who were carrying Secret 
Service passports, remain in custody in Qatar. 
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On February, two Qatari nationals, Ibat Akhmedov and Naser Ibragim Midahi 
were arrested at Moscow’s Sheremetevo airport. The pair was apparently 
traveling as part of the Qatari wrestling team, en route to a tournament in Serbia. 
(2) According to the explanation given by the initial arresting authority–the 
customs service–Akhmedov was carrying $7200 in undeclared currency. But 
shortly after their initial arrest, the FSB took custody of the men, claiming that 
they fit the description of the men believed to have carried out the Moscow Metro 
bombing on February 6. The detainees, so the FSB claimed, were to take part in 
a police line-up. (3) Since then, Akhmedov and Midahi have been held without 
access to lawyers at the notorious Lefortovo Prison. According to an FSB 
spokesman, they have been charged with "offences that carry lengthy prison 
terms if they are found guilty." He added that Qatari embassy officials had been 
permitted to visit the two men to ascertain the "conditions of their detention and 
their health." (4) 
 
At first glance, the arrest of the two wrestlers looks remarkably like quid pro quo 
action, reminiscent of cold-war exchanges between rival powers. But 
interestingly, as yet the Russian government has given no public indication that 
the two men are Qatari intelligence agents. They are accused simply of terrorist 
activities. This is in stark contrast to events in Qatar since the arrest of the two 
Russian agents. 
 
According to a recent article in The Washington Post, there is much more to this 
story than meets the eye. Apparently, Putin’s government had been negotiating 
for some time with the Qatari government for the extradition of Yanderbiyev. The 
Qatari government’s response to Russia’s request, was that if evidence of 
Yanderbiyev’s connection to Chechen terror groups could be shown, he would be 
arrested and tried in Qatari courts. According to The Washington Post, these 
terms were accepted by Russia a week before Yanderbiyev was assassinated. 
(5) 
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Qatari security services were able to track the alleged killers quickly, only through 
their "sloppy tradecraft" (6): witnesses at Yanderbiyev’s mosque recalled seeing 
a van parked near his SUV. The van was traced to a rental agency, where Qatari 
officers were able to view security camera footage in order to identify the leasers. 
The address provided for the men by the rental agency was "a villa that had been 
rented recently by a Russian diplomat, but that didn’t have diplomatic status." 
The Post’s story corrects one important detail: the men were arrested at the villa, 
not, as previously believed, in Dubai en route back to Russia. (7) 
 
A further development sure to be causing deep concern in Moscow, is the fact 
that the Qatari authorities claim the two men to have confessed to everything, 
including their status as Secret Service officers. Both are apparently members of 
GRU (8), and are known to authorities by their activities in Chechnya "where they 
orchestrated special operations against field commanders." (9) This is the 
version presented by Usman Ferzauli, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ichkeria. 
Moreover, the men are said to have revealed the names of the senior officers 
from whom the assassination orders came. (10) 
 
Last Friday, Kommersant Daily published a story, quickly denied by the FSB, 
alleging that an "unnamed FSB source" had suggested that a forcible rescue of 
the two agents might be mounted. (11) 
 
The same Kommersant story claimed that the Qatari detainees had been handed 
over by the FSB to the Foreign Ministry, so that negotiations could begin for an 
exchange between Qatar and Russia. Agence-France Presse and ITAR-TASS 
carried the same news. But the FSB spokesman also denied these reports, 
stating that "they are not being held in any foreign ministry retreat." (12) 
 
Then on 24 March, the FSB released the two Qataris from Lefortovo prison 
because of the "absence of any indication" that they were involved in criminal 
activities. (13) The to men were flown home the same day. Why did the FSB 
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refuse to hand over the prisoners to the Foreign Ministry, so that negotiations for 
exchange could take place? It is possible that the combination of a new 
administration at the Foreign Ministry and this incident provided the FSB with the 
ideal opportunity to attempt to extend its influence into the realm of Foreign 
Affairs. The FSB's actions in this incident have scuttled the Foreign Ministry's 
diplomatic efforts, making it look weak and ineffective, and have resulted in two 
Russian agents being left at the mercy of the Qatari courts. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Volume IX Number 4, 5 Mar 04 
(2) WPS Russian Political Monitor, 19 Mar 04, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) BBC Monitoring, 19 March 2004, ITAR-TASS via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(5) "In Qatar, Standing Up to Putin," 16 Mar 04, David Ignatius, Washington Post. 
www.washingtonpost.com 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) WPS Russian Political Monitor, 19 Mar 04, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(9) BBC Monitoring, 19 Mar 04, ITAR-TASS via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(10) WPS Russian Political Monitor, 19 Mar 04, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(11) Agence-France-Presse, 19 Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) Agence-France-Presse, 24 Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
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By Scott Dullea 
 
Kremlin outsourcing in a crisis: Luzhkov goes to Batumi 
Throughout the most recent crisis between Adjaria and Tblisi, which appears to 
have been resolved for the time being, Moscow pledged its neutrality and urged 
a peaceful solution. Russian neutrality, of course, did not mean the Kremlin 
would remain uninvolved, but its involvement was not led by the Russian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA)— perhaps a prudent move on Moscow’s part, as had it 
done so, it could have been seen by Tblisi, and perhaps internationally, as 
heavy-handed interference. Thus, Moscow was represented, albeit only semi-
officially, by Moscow’s Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. 
 
As tensions mounted between Batumi and Tblisi, Luzhkov reportedly took it upon 
himself to travel to Adjaria to meet with the autonomous region’s leader, Aslan 
Abashidze. Later he said this was a responsibility he could not ignore given his 
status as an honorary citizen of Georgia, Adjaria, Batumi and Tbilisi. (1) The 
support Moscow gave to his presence, however, might indicate that Lushkov was 
representing more than just his own personal interests. A spokesman for the 
Russian MFA said that Luzhkov had not coordinated his trip with the ministry, but 
as long as he was there urged Georgian officials to use his presence to "achieve 
a peaceful outcome to the situation." (2) On the day of Luzhkov’s arrival, the new 
secretary of the Russian Security Council, Igor Ivanov, spoke with Georgian 
President Mikhail Saakashvili by phone and requested he permit Luzhkov’s 
presence. Luzhkov was, indeed, subsequently allowed into Adjaria where he met 
with Abashidze for several hours. 
 
Luzhkov is no stranger to international affairs, nor should he be as mayor of the 
one of the world’s largest city. Other examples of his international endeavors as 
mayor include visits with leaders of Macedonia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and 
Lithuania (to name but a few), demands for investigation of mafia corruption in 
United States banks, and even speaking out against NATO enlargement. But 
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Luzhkov often represents more than just the citizens of Moscow. In October 
2003, he was selected to co-chair the joint Japanese-Russian so-called Council 
of Sages as an official representative of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The 
council, designed as a group of elder statesmen from both sides, has the mission 
to discuss the sensitive outstanding issues between the two countries. Since the 
announcement of the council’s establishment last year, however, there have 
been no reports of any council activities or meetings. 
 
Putin’s use of Luzhkov, his one time rival for the presidency, as an envoy is not 
unique. Luzhkov’s one-time political partner, Yevgeni M. Primakov has also 
served President Putin in that role on several occasions. Primakov, however, 
would probably have been a poor choice to represent Moscow’s interests in this 
most recent Georgian case, for as the President of the Russian Federation 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, he is too tightly tied to the Kremlin and the 
MFA. Nor would Primakov, a well-known advocate of reintegration of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, have been warmly welcomed by Tblisi. 
Thus, Luzhkov’s seemingly semi-private participation in the Georgia-Adjaria crisis 
seems to have been just the right dosage of Russian representation to achieve 
the desired solution. In an interview following the crisis, he acknowledged the 
synchronization of his efforts with the position of the Kremlin: "I treat my efforts 
quite reservedly, as the position of the country’s leadership played a great role in 
the issue with which I acted in harmony. (…) [F]or the first time without interfering 
in this very difficult situation Russia managed to subtly and diplomatically exert 
influence, so that this conflict would not grow into shooting and bloodshed". (3) 
 
The success of this unofficial envoy mission featuring Luzhkov, whom President 
Putin has since praised for his work in Adjaria, may mean that the Moscow 
mayor could be making more regular appearances on the Kremlin’s behalf 
wherever a crisis requires reserved but definite Russian involvement. 
 
Personnel changes at Smolenskaya Square 
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The selection of Mikhail Fradkov as Russian Prime Minster means changes 
throughout the government. While President Vladimir Putin may have selected 
Fradkov as the new premier based on the sum of his qualities, skills and 
experiences, Fradkov’s most recent service at the European Union (E.U.) as 
Russia’s representative will no doubt be to Moscow’s advantage as it tries to sort 
out the unresolved issues between itself and the E.U., prior to the Union’s 
approaching enlargement. Reportedly, Fradkov has already used his E.U.-related 
resourcefulness to settle the issue of the post-enlargement quota on Russian 
steel exports to the E.U. in Moscow’s favor. (4) 
 
The installment of the newly-identified members of Fradkov’s cabinet also means 
changes at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The former foreign minister, 
Igor Ivanov, has been appointed Secretary of the Russian Federation Security 
Council. As this position’s responsibilities and authority are historically ill-defined 
and based on the personality of its leader and his support from the president, it is 
difficult to gauge what influence Ivanov will command on the country’s security 
and foreign policies. A Rossiskaya gazeta article would only predict: "The 
Security Council will probably concentrate on analytical work on national security 
issues, and this could include any area of activity…" — quite a revelation! (5) 
Based on his overall work at the MFA though, it is unlikely that Ivanov will wield 
significant influence from his new post. While some supporters of Ivanov 
compliment him for trying to give some definition to Russian foreign policy during 
his five years as foreign minister, he did not always play the leading role in 
Russian foreign affairs. The foreign policy spotlight was sometimes stolen by 
other figures, such as elder statesman Yevgeni Primakov and, more recently, 
Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov. 
 
On his way out of the MFA, however, Ivanov reportedly proposed his successor, 
Sergei V. Lavrov. Lavrov is a career diplomat with experience in the Soviet and 
Russian MFA who was reportedly one of the leading candidates to succeed 
Primakov as foreign minister in 1998. (6) Since 1972 he has served in leadership 
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positions in its Department of International Economic Organizations and on the 
interdepartmental commission on coordinating Russia's participation in 
peacekeeping operations, as a deputy minister of foreign affairs, and most 
recently as the Russian permanent representative to the United Nations (U.N.) 
and also as the Russian representative to U.N. Security Council. 
 
As with Fradkov’s E.U. expertise, Lavrov’s nine years of U.N. duty will certainly 
be an advantage as Moscow continues to press for reform of the Security 
Council. So far there is no indication that he intends any radical changes as his 
public statements more or less reflect the party line: "Russia will elect partners 
based on its national interests (…) The concept of Russia's foreign policy is 
determined by President Vladimir Putin and his policy should be pursued (…) 
This is a multi-vector policy and its major goal is to preserve Russia's territorial 
integrity and security (…) [and it should] help improve the social and economic 
state of citizens." (7) Moreover, his more specific comments suggest an aim to 
maintain continuity in the country’s foreign policy, particularly regarding the 
reintegration of the Commonwealth of Independent States, cooperation with 
NATO and the role of the U.N. (8) 
 
So far, only one other personnel change has been reported at the MFA. 
President Putin has appointed Aleksandr P. Losyukov Russian Ambassador to 
Japan. Losyukov has served as a deputy foreign minister during Primakov's 
tenure as foreign minister, and since 2000 he has been, more specifically, 
responsible for relations with Asian countries. Given his record, Ambassador 
Losyukov can be expected to continue the task of strengthening ties with Tokyo 
while simultaneously avoiding a commitment on the resolution of the peace treaty 
and Kurile Island issues. No successor has yet been named for Losyukov’s Asian 
affairs responsibilities. 
 
Russia stands by France against U.S. Greater Middle East Initiative 
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It is not unusual for Moscow to complain about what it perceives as U.S. 
interference in a "Russian zone of interest." Now, Moscow is standing by France 
against similar "interference" in a "French zone of interest." In early March, 
Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov and then Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Igor Ivanov met with their respective French counterparts and French President 
Jacques Chirac in Paris. They discussed, among other things, the so-called U.S. 
Greater Middle East Initiative, which is aimed at promoting democracy and 
economic reform in the Middle East. 
 
Although Igor Ivanov stated that Moscow was considering the U.S. proposals for 
an international conference on the Middle East, a Russian defense ministry 
official indicated that both Russia and France object to U.S. interference in the 
so-called Mahgreb region, that is: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and 
Libya, as this is historically a "French zone of interest." (9) 
 
In supporting France against this U.S. initiative, which Washington has 
apparently tabled for the time being due to lack of support, particularly from the 
countries of the Greater Middle East themselves, Moscow will no doubt look 
forward to future French backing in countering U.S. moves in the parts of the 
Greater Middle East that comprise or approach the countries the Kremlin might 
consider "Russian zones of interest." 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) CENTRE TV, 20 Mar 04 via ITAR-TASS, 20 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database. 
(2) RTR TV, 16 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(3) CENTRE TV, 20 Mar 04 via ITAR-TASS, 20 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database. 
(4) ROSSISKAYA GAZETA, 6 Mar 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0306 via World News 
Connection, 8 Mar 04. 
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(5) 10 Mar 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0310 via World News Connection. 
(6) http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/09/110998.asp. 
(7) ITAR-TASS, 10 March; FBIS-SOV-2004-0310 via World News Connection, 
11 Mar 04. 
(8) ITAR-TASS, 17 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(9) ITAR-TASS, 9 Mar 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0309 via World News Connection, 10 
Mar 04. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
ELECTIONS 
Who’s counting? 
While the outcome of the 14 March presidential elections was no surprise, the 
actual numbers of voters showing up certainly was: There was a surprising rise in 
eligible voters for the parliamentary elections in December, (1) and now that rise 
suddenly has disappeared. Indeed, roughly 900,000 appear to be missing, when 
totals of voters from December are compared with this month’s numbers for the 
presidential election. 
 
Some analysts have attributed the drop in the rolls to a cynical manipulation to 
improve vote counts. Nikolai Petrov, an analyst at the Carnegie Center in 
Moscow, claims that it "was a statistical trick consciously meant to raise turnout 
by lowering the number of voters.... The scale is in fact bigger than 900,000," he 
said. According to Petrov, 1.5 million voters were removed from the list, and 
600,000 were reinstated when they showed up to vote. Lilia Shibanova, the head 
of an association of voters’ rights NGOs, noted that observers in 26 regions 
documented instances of voters having their names cut from the registers. Such 
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cases were documented in Samara, Stavropol, Irkutsk and Krasnodar, she said. 
In Samara, "we have information about an instruction from the administration of 
the industrial district... that the election committees themselves should cut and 
‘clean up’ the lists of voters," Shibanova’s association reported. (2) 
 
Indeed, the turnout was the only part of the election that hadn’t been foreseen. 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had criticized 
the manner in which state administrative resources and state-run media had 
handled the December 2003 parliamentary elections, and the run-up to the 
presidential elections. The post-election report reiterated its concern for the 
development of the democratic process in Russia, noting — in addition to the 
aforementioned official abuses — pervasive instances of "open voting" at polling 
stations. 
 
The OSCE evaluation was not a rarity. A monitoring center set up by (losing) 
candidates Irina Khakamada, Sergei Glazyev and Nikolai Kharitonov reported 
that patients in at least one psychiatric clinic received ballots already marked for 
Putin. Moreover, a worker at the monitoring center showed a video, reportedly 
filmed with a hidden camera, showing a teacher directing her students’ parents 
as to how to vote. "I ask, even insist, that you vote at the polling station here at 
the school," the teacher said on the video. "And logically, your children's grades 
will depend on how actively you vote. And if you vote for Putin, we will get money 
from the district administration for computers. Otherwise, we will get nothing. 
Believe me, this kind of chance comes but rarely." (3) 
 
Putin’s amazing popularity, with over 71 percent of the national vote, has been 
explained in a number of ways. The main motivation appearing in the media is 
pragmatism: Since Putin’s overwhelming victory over his challengers was 
expected, many groups voted in order to show their support, and avoid any 
administrative retribution. 
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Preliminary results show unbelievable levels of support in several republics: In 
Kabardino-Balkaria, 96.49 percent of voters reportedly selected Putin; in 
Chechnya, an astonishing 92.3 percent of votes were counted as supporting the 
president; Bashkortostan reportedly brought in 91.84 percent, Ingushetia, 98.2 
percent; Mordovia, 91.35 percent; North Ossetia, 91.2 percent; and Chukotka, 
87.24 percent. However, such numbers should be taken with a grain of salt. 
Some voting station workers in Chechnya said they were ordered to stuff ballot 
boxes, and many election violations were reported in Bashkortostan. (4) 
 
Certainly, the more politically aware regional leaders were quick to note their 
region’s overwhelming support of the president during voting, clearly remaining 
hopeful that the administration would shower its favors on regions that did their 
bit, regardless of the tenor of their earlier relations. Vladimir Yegorov, Governor 
of the Kaliningrad Region, said that "We have always felt the support of Vladimir 
Putin, and we are sure to feel it in the future." "Residents of the Urals area said 
an emphatic Yes to the president's course towards the revival of a strong state, 
the establishment of order in the country, the steady development of the 
economy, the democratic principles and the multi-party system," said Eduard 
Rossel, governor of the Sverdlovsk Region and a frequent irritant to the Kremlin 
due to his region’s independent, often anti-federal, attitude. Ivan Malakhov, 
Governor of the Sakhalin Region, saw Putin's re-election as guaranteeing 
continuation of the policy aimed at the development of offshore oil and gas 
deposits of the Sakhalin Island. (5) 
 
Putin’s recorded level of support was strong even in the few instances in which a 
challenger did well. The president received 75.6 percent of the vote in the 
Southern Federal District (which includes Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria and 
Ingushetia), 74.7 percent in the Northwest Federal District (which includes his 
hometown, St. Petersburg), 74 percent in the Volga Federal District, and 73.6 in 
the Urals Federal District. He received 67.4 percent in the Central Federal District 
(which includes Moscow), 64.7 in the Far East Federal District, 66.1 percent in 
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the Siberian Federal District, and 54.8 percent in the Belgograd District. The 
second-place finisher, Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) 
representative Nikolai Kharitonov, received 13.7 percent of the national vote, 
doing best in regions that traditionally support the KPRF. He gained more than 
80 percent in his native Ust-Tarsk district (part of the Novosibirsk region) and 52 
percent in the Mashkovskt district (also in Novosibirsk); he garnered 21.52 
percent in Chuvashia and 24.57 in Orenburg. Other challengers couldn’t even 
claim a nominal success: Sergei Glazyev received 4.1 percent of the vote, Irina 
Khakamada, 3.9 percent, Oleg Malyshkin of the Liberal Democratic Party, 2 
percent, and Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov, .0.8 percent. "Against 
all" surpassed Malyshkin and Mironov, with 3.5 percent of the votes. (6) 
 
Loud declarations of support apparently are required; the administration has 
proven to be not averse to handing out punishment. For example, after 
Konstantin Titov, the regional Governor of Samara ran against Putin in 2000, 
federal authorities closed a regional military headquarters there and relocated the 
offices of the local presidential representative, bringing a loss of money and face 
to the region. (7) 
 
Of course, the presidential election was not the only contest being fought on 14 
March. Some by-elections and gubernatorial elections also were held. In 
Ulyanovsk, two of the three vacant State Duma seats were filled; however, the 
third remains open, due to the electoral success of "Against All." This is the 
second time the "Against All" option won a substantial number of votes for 
parliamentary seating in the past three months. (8) 
 
Four of the ten gubernatorial elections also require further polling, as winners 
were not determined in the first round of voting. The incumbent governors of 
Koryakia autonomous district and the Altai region, Vladimir Loginov and 
Alexander Surikov, respectively, led in the voting, but did not receive sufficient 
support to avoid a runoff situation. Runoff elections also will be held in 
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Arkhangelsk (Governor Anatoli Yefremov came in second) and Ryazan (where 
Governor Vyacheslav Lyubimov came in third, and so won’t even be participating 
in the second round of voting). Six governors were re-elected: Ravil Geniatulin 
(Chita), Anatoli Artamonov (Kaluga), Aleksandr Tkachyov (Krasnodar), Yuri 
Yevdokimov (Murmansk), Aleksandr Volkov (Udmurtia) and Vladimir Kulakov 
(Voronezh). (9) 
 
In regional Duma elections, "Against All" continued to do well against other 
candidates in Sverdlovsk. While the United Russia party obtained a majority of 
the seats with 35 percent of the vote, "Against All" came in second with 13 
percent. (10) Elsewhere, United Russia continued its victorious run, obtaining a 
constitutional majority in the Tatarstan State Council elections. (11) 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Finding a flagpole to rally ‘round 
Still reeling from the December 2003 election and United Russia’s massive vote 
count, Russia’s other political parties continue to try to pick up the pieces and 
form a coherent whole. A few of those parties have sought that coherent whole 
by throwing out some pieces altogether. 
 
Certainly the messiest political divorce involved the Rodina (Motherland) bloc, 
particularly the split between its two founders, Dmitri Rogozin and Sergei 
Glazyev. As discussed earlier, (12) the Rogozin-Glazyev dispute that had brewed 
for months came to a head with Glazyev’s (failed) attempt to name a new party 
Rodina and (failed) run for the presidency. It hasn’t been a good couple of 
months for the politician. In February, a special congress of the Party of Russian 
Regions expelled him from the party’s ranks. (13) And the Rodina faction held 
meetings without him. Indeed, according to Rogozin, Glazyev’s future with the 
faction would be discussed with him at a later date. (14) Meanwhile, Rogozin has 
plans for Rodina’s future. Speaking in Berlin last week, Rogozin said the party 
will adopt a social-democratic program during its June 2004 congress. (15) 
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Another political bloc that is bursting at its seams is the left-wing coalition of 
forces known as the Russian People’s Patriotic Union, due to the on-again, off-
again, on-again power struggle between KPRF leader Gennadi Zyuganov and 
Gennadi Semigin, a KPRF member and chairman of the executive committee of 
the Patriotic Union. While Zyuganov’s crowd remains the party with the most 
power (though everything is relative after the dismal parliamentary election 
showing), Semigin reportedly is attempting to consolidate the parties and 
movements in the Union that are not under Zyuganov’s control, thereby splitting 
an already fractured left wing. Last week, he succeeded in that venture, as more 
than 1,000 delegates — including some members of the KPRF — rallied to mark 
the creation of a new "patriotic" coalition preparing for the 2007 parliamentary 
elections. "The results of the presidential election are a serious failure for the 
Communist Party. The party badly needs modernization, a new program and new 
leaders," Semigin said. (16) 
 
A congress of the KPRF Central Committee is scheduled to meet at the end of 
the month to deal with the schism. At that point, the KPRF has three choices: 
kick Semigin out of the party, wrest control of the Union’s executive committee 
from him, or withdraw from the Union altogether. (17) The option chosen will 
provide indication of how powerful the KPRF, and Zyuganov, remain. 
 
Meanwhile, the Union of Right-Wing Forces (SPS) is grooming itself to be a 
supporter of the president, despite years of opposition to the government. 
According to a statement by the party’s political council, Putin now is 
advantageously placed to carry out the "liberal reforms" he already has launched. 
Two of SPS’ former chairmen, Boris Nemtsov and Anatoli Chubais, participated 
as members in the meeting that issued the statement. Khakamada, on the other 
hand, does not appear willing to compromise to the extent of her fellow former 
leaders, she has announced plans to create her own party. (18) 
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Such splits are inevitable in the development of political parties. Other splits are 
not. In a particularly gruesome extension of politics, Mikhail Kodanev, leader of a 
faction of Liberal Russia that supported exiled oligarch Boris Berezovsky, was 
convicted of organizing the April 2003 assassination of MP Sergei Yushenkov, 
the leader of the registered faction of Liberal Russia that had ousted the 
Berezovsky group. A Moscow court ruled that Kodanev and his associates 
plotted the murder in order to win control over the party. Boris Berezovsky 
protested Kodanev’s innocence and claimed that his supporter had no motive for 
the killing. (19) In addition to Kodanev, Kodanev’s aide, Aleksandr Vinnik, and 
two other defendants were found guilty; another two defendants were acquitted. 
Yushenkov’s widow, Valentine Yushenkova, expressed her faith in the jury’s 
decision. (20) 
 
MEDIA 
New government creates oversight agency 
The ripples from the pre-election change of government continue to be visible, 
and at least one portion of the media is happy about it. The Media Ministry, led 
by Mikhail Lesin, has been superceded by the newly -formed Federal Agency for 
Press and Mass Communications, headed by Lesin’s former deputy, Mikhail 
Seslavinsky. Lesin, who served as minister since the post was created in 1999, 
purportedly turned down an offer to head the new agency, which, despite its 
grand title, is expected to have less power than the ministry. (21) 
 
Seslavinsky’s ascendance is good news, according to Radio Liberty analyst 
Anna Kachkayeva. He "is an experienced and intelligent man who knows 
everyone in the industry," she said. Seslavinsky headed the Federal Television 
and Radio Broadcasting Service at the end of the 1990s until the service was 
abolished. He subsequently became first deputy head of the Media Ministry. He 
is believed to be responsible for creating a transparent system for the issuing of 
television broadcast licenses. (22) 
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As to the purpose of the new agency, Seslavinsky explained that it "should not 
and cannot be a supervisory body. Its main task is to ensure a free and full-
fledged development of all the media and the real implementation of the 
constitutional principle of the freedom of speech." (23) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) The NIS Observed, 3 Mar 04. 
(2) Moscow Times, 19 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) Moscow Times, 16 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) Moscow Times, 16 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Tass, 15 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) Moscow Times, 16 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) Financial Times, 10 Mar 04 via Johnson’s Russia List #8107, 10 Mar 04. 
(8) Ekho Moskvy, 0445 GMT, 15 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) Kommersant, No. 46, RusData Dialine, 16 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(10) Channel 4 TV, 1530 GMT, 15 Mar 04, BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis 
(11) Tatar-Inform, 1537 GMT, 17 Mar 04, BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) The NIS Observed, 3 Mar 04. 
(13) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 Feb 04, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet 
Press via Lexis-Nexis. 
(14) ITAR-TASS, 1442 GMT, 16 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) TASS, 17 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(16) Agence France Presse, 20 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(17) Gazeta, 19 Mar 04, What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(18) TASS, 18 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(19) Agence France Presse, 19 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(20) IPR Strategic Business Information, 21 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(21) Global News Wire, 17 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(22) Moscow Times, 18 Mar 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(23) ITAR-TASS, 1111 GMT, 19 Mar 04, BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Kris Beasly and Paul Lyons 
 
Final Reflections on Exercise "Security 2004" 
As discussed previously in the NIS Observed, Russia held what President Putin 
described as the largest military exercises "in twenty years" last month. (1) Most 
of the exercise went according to plan, but the Northern Fleet suffered two major 
failures on 17 and 18 Feb 04. On the 17th, the Russian Navy’s newest nuclear 
powered ballistic missile submarine, the Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) class boat 
Novomoskovsk failed to launch 2 RSM-54 "Sineva" (SS-N-23) sea-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBM). Then on 18 Feb, the Karelia, sister ship to the 
Novomoskovsk, fired an RSM-54 that veered off-course 98 seconds after launch 
and was destroyed by its internal self-destruct mechanism. (2) 
 
In the pre-glasnost days, of course, the Russia public would never have found 
out about the mishaps and the lack of preparedness they revealed. Even now, 
the political and military leaders instinctively try to cover up problems that might 
reflect poorly on them, rather than try to examine the problems and work to fix 
them in the light of day. Certainly, Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir 
Kuroyedov, of Kursk infamy, yielded to what commentator Alexander Golts 
called, "the instinctive temptation of lying" even when it put Putin and Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov in an awkward position. (3) After a flurry of confusion, 
Kuroyedov told the press that the Novomoskovsk launches were "simulations," 
never actually designed to fire a missile. The media scoffed, because all the pre-
exercise publicity had indicated the launches were to be real. And Putin, no 
doubt concerned about both his re-election campaign and the growing, but still 
fragile prestige he has worked so hard to gain for the military, said nothing about 
the 17 Feb failures even though he was present at the launch attempts. Further, 
on 18 Feb, rather than mention the loss of the Karelia’s missile, he instead chose 
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to divert attention during a press conference on national TV by announcing that 
Russia had just tested the first multiple independently re-targetable maneuvering 
reentry vehicles (Mares) in the world. (4) In fact, while the launch failure stories 
were carried in most newspapers, under pressure from the Kremlin both major 
state-run national channels failed to mention them at all. And when independent 
analyst Pavel Felgenhauer was interviewed on two other channels, both he and 
the anchors were very worried about the consequences of mentioning the 
mishaps on the air. (5) The General Staff, even after it admitted that the Karelia’s 
missile had blown up, passed the buck to Admiral Kuroyedov on the question of 
what happened on the Novomoskovsk. 
 
But this poor job of a cover up didn’t last long. Immediately following the 
exercise, a technical committee was set up to check into the destruction of the 
Karelia’s RSM-54. (6) And on 1 Mar 04, President Putin, perhaps not wanting to 
appear a fool again, as he did in the days after the loss of the Kursk, publicly 
demanded the Defense Ministry and the military immediately investigate both 
failures and, after finding and fixing the problem(s), conduct a repeat of the test 
launches in the near future. (7) 
 
An intergovernmental commission, with representatives from the Defense 
Ministry, the Russian Shipbuilding Agency (for technical knowledge of the 
submarine) and the Russian Aeronautical and Space Agency (for technical 
knowledge of the SLBM), was dispatched to the Northern Fleet under the 
leadership of Colonel-General Aleksandr Rukshin, Deputy Chief of the General 
Staff and Chief of the Central Operations Department (roughly the equivalent of 
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff J-3). (8) 
 
General Rukshin’s commission looked at four possible reasons for the 
Novomoskovsk’s problem: 1) loss of signal from the Cyclon-B satellite navigation 
system, 2) a technical malfunction of the Shlyuz system (ADK-3M) of the Tobol-
M navigation system, 3) an inoperative launch system or 4) a malfunction aboard 
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the RSM-54 itself. Before leaving Moscow, the committee quickly ruled out the 
first possibility, after verifying the satellites had been working properly. After they 
arrived at Northern Fleet headquarters and reviewed the logs and data stored in 
the various computer systems, they determined that the Shlyuz system (part of 
the navigation system onboard the submarine that fed updated coordinates to the 
missile guidance set) had failed three and a half minutes before launch. As soon 
as the submarine’s Omnibus-BDRM launch control computer recognized that the 
missile was no longer getting the most recent updates of the submarine’s 
position, it automatically prevented the launch. (9) As noted in the previous NIS 
Observed, both Izvestiya and Kommersant reported that the submarine’s 
commander had discovered a failure of the weapon control system during pre-
launch actions and they both pointed out that this was the first launch attempt in 
many years without a technical expert from the missile design bureau on board. 
(10) But, based on the reported results of the commission, it appears that the 
crew was not at fault, although a design engineer aboard may have been able to 
resolve the problem and allow the exercise to continue. But if that had happened, 
of course it would not have given a true combat simulation. 
 
While I am not an expert on Russian submarine targeting and launch systems, 
my years of experience as an ICBM launch officer lead me to believe that this is 
not as bad a problem as it seems, for two reasons. One, because this was a test 
launch and not an Emergency War Orders launch, the rules of safety probably 
were set up so that the missile had to have the submarine’s most current position 
with 30 seconds or a minute of launch, so it could make a safe and exact flight to 
the target. An ICBM or SLBM, once brought on line, always tracks where it is 
using its own internal gyroscopes, but can be off by a small margin without an 
update from external sources. In a wartime launch, the type of target determines 
if an outside update is required or if the small error won’t matter (i.e. if the target 
is not hardened). But in peacetime launches, range safety officers always want 
the outside update, to ensure the test shot doesn’t stray and hit somewhere you 
really don’t want it to. The second reason I think this is less of a problem than 
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some made it out to be is that in wartime, the crew would have overridden the 
automatic mode (with its built in safety feature) and, launched the missile in any 
case (assuming it wasn’t a hard target). 
 
The commission then looked at the second, more spectacular failure, the self-
destruction of the RSM-54 after its launch from the Karelia on 18 February. In 
this case, two possible malfunctions were examined: 1) incorrect targeting of the 
sortie (either by crew error or a malfunction in the Tobol-M navigational system) 
or 2) a hardware or software problem with the missile guidance set itself. The 
reason they focused in on these areas is because they had earlier determined 
that the missile self-destructed when it calculated that it was flying outside the 
allowable flight path. In other words, the rocket motors worked fine, but the 
missile was going somewhere it wasn’t supposed to be going. Again, the 
committee reviewed the logs, computer dumps from the shipboard computers 
and the telemetry data from the missile (for, as with all test shots, the warhead 
was replaced with telemetry gathering sensors). In this case, they determined 
that the flight control software of the missile guidance set (created by the 
Yekaterinburg Scientific and Industrial Enterprise of Automatic Systems) had a 
bug that allowed it to stray off course. (11) No further details have been released 
about exactly what the bug did, but apparently the problem could either be 
worked around with procedures or actually resolved with a new software load. In 
light of the short time before the re-test, I believe procedural workarounds were 
put in place, since it seems likely that the Russians, like the U.S., very carefully 
tests any changes to the missile flight control program for nuclear missiles and 
that would take months. 
 
General Rukshin’s group also examined the structure and operation control of 
the exercise, perhaps making for uncomfortable times for Admiral Sergei 
Simonenko, the Northern Fleet Chief of Staff and the acting fleet commander, 
Admiral Suchkov having been removed in Sept 2003 after the loss of the K-159 
submarine, and nine lives, en route to the scrap yard. So far nothing has been 
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released concerning either the exercise procedures or the job status of the 
Admiral. (12) 
 
After the commission finished its work in Severomorsk, it returned to Moscow 
and briefed Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov (and possibly President Putin) on its 
findings and corrective actions. Ivanov then dispatched Admiral Kuroyedov up 
north to supervise a repeat of the exercise. In a period of several hours on 17 
March 04, the Novomoskovsk successfully launched two RSM-54 missiles from 
launch depth that impacted their intended targets on the Kura Firing Range on 
the Kamchatka peninsula. (13) 
 
The successful live-fire may have resolved the technical problems and revived 
the spirits of Putin and Ivanov (to say nothing of the entire Navy chain of 
command) but the whole episode has raised several questions among Russian 
military experts. Both retired Admiral Eduard Baltin, former commander of a 
missile submarine division and of the Black Sea Fleet, and Major-General 
Vladimir Dvorkin, currently a research fellow at the Russian Academy of Science, 
agree that the episode shows that the Navy has cultural and training problems. 
They agree that Russian military leaders, especially Navy brass, have lied and 
covered up problems rather than simply acknowledging them and moving out to 
fix them. Both observers agree that this is a cultural and integrity issue that must 
be fixed. Both also see a chain of command that hasn’t been attentive enough to 
the sailor’s training needs even though they don’t go to sea as often as is 
required. Finally, Dvorkin sees this whole sorry mess as "an additional signal that 
it’s time to unite Russia’s nuclear triad, creating strategic deterrence forces under 
a united command. Such a structure would ensure uniform requirements for 
levels of combat training, systems of use, reliability of armaments and military 
hardware, and nuclear safety." In another case of the top brass resisting military 
reform at every chance, Dvorkin states that, "…well-founded plans for such 
changes have long been available, but the General Staff has concentrated all 
operational and administrative functions in its own hands, stubbornly refusing to 
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delegate authority down the chain of command. There are no other reasons..." 
why the plan shouldn’t be implemented he said. (14) 
 
The continued ignoble conduct of the senior military officers is a shame on them 
and stains the honor of their service and the entire officer corps. And a joint 
command of nuclear forces has proven to be a success in the U.S. military, since 
the standing up of U.S. Strategic Command in 1992. 
 
One final note: in the post-exercise news conference, Colonel-General 
Baluyevsky, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, proudly said that two of the 
new "permanent readiness" units were redeployed across Russia via rail and 
then completed live-fire tactical exercises. While this is highly encouraging, it’s 
interesting to note that, unlike the U.S., which sends a brigade at a time to both 
the National Training Center at Fort Irwin and the Joint Training Center at Fort 
Polk, in this case the deployed unit was a motor rifle company. (15) Russia is 
making progress, no doubt, but lack of funds and poor unit readiness are still 
hindering training significantly. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ITAR-TASS, 1346 GMT 18 Feb 04, FBIS-SOV-2004-0218 via World News 
Connection. 
(2) NIS Observed, 4 Mar 04; IZVESTIYA, 20 Feb 04, FBIS-SOV-2004-0220 via 
World News Connection; ITAR-TASS, 1351 GMT 18 Feb 04, FBIS-SOV-2004-
0218 via World News Connection; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 20 Feb 04, FBIS-
SOV-2004-0220 via World News Connection. 
(3) Pravda.Russia, 3 Mar 04, via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) #8098, 3 Mar 04. 
(4) ROSBALT, 19 Feb 04, via JRL #8075, 20 Feb 04; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 
20 Feb 04, FBIS-SOV-2004-0220 via World News Connection. 
(5) THE MOSCOW TIMES, 2 Mar 04 via 
www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/03/02/009.html. 
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Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(9) Kommersant, 27 Feb Mar 04; What the Papers Say (Defense and Security), 1 
Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets; Kommersant, 10 Mar 04; What the Papers Say 
(Defense and Security), 12 Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(10) IZVESTIYA, 20 Feb 04, FBIS-SOV-2004-0220 via World News Connection; 
KOMMERSANT, 19 Feb 04; BBC Monitoring via JRL #8079, 23 Feb 04. 
(11) Kommersant, 27 Feb Mar 04 via What the Papers Say (Defense and 
Security); 1 Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets; Kommersant, 10 Mar 04 via What 
the Papers Say (Defense and Security); 12 Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
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(13) ITAR-TASS, 17 Mar 04 via What the Papers Say (Defense and Security); 19 
Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets; REUTERS, 17 Mar 04 via JRL #8124, 18 Mar 
04. 
(14) NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 3 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring via JRL #8103, 6 Mar 
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(15) KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 Mar 04; What the Papers Say (Defense and 
Security), 5 Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Dept. of Defense or the 
United States government. 
 
NAVY 
All's well that ends well? The Navy in the nuclear triad 
Cognizant of the pre-election dismissal of the nation’s entire cabinet and with 
fresh memories of last month’s failure to execute three submarine launched 
missiles, job security and competency were at issue when the Northern Fleet 
conducted its latest round of launches this week. Like a round from CBS's The 
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Apprentice and facing the likelihood of being summoned to President Putin’s 
boardroom to account for their failures, Navy Commander-In-Chief Kuroyedov 
and Northern Fleet Commander, Admiral Simonenko came through - or did they? 
 
Consistent with Russia's history and mastery of the art of deception, the launches 
conducted by the submarine Novomoskovsk were conducted several hours later 
than planned. At question is why the Novomoskovsk was unable to launch at the 
predetermined launch time. Did "technical" problems delay the launch as was 
alleged during the failed launches in February or was it another "simulated" 
launch that was only a precursor to the eventual launch some four hours later? 
The answers may illuminate even more issues both within the leadership and the 
combat readiness of the Navy to fulfill its ever increasing role within Russia's 
nuclear triad. 
 
The nuclear-powered submarine, Novomoskovsk, successfully executed an 
operational test firing of two RSM-54 long-range missiles from the Barents Sea to 
a landing site some 4000-plus miles to the east in the Kamchatka peninsula. 
Interfax news agency quoted Navy spokesman Igor Dygalo as saying after the 
first of the two launches that "the head of the rocket reached the range at the 
appointed time."(1) All accounts point to a successful conclusion for the second 
missile firing as well. 
 
The importance of these missile tests can not be understated. Last month’s 
failures, personally witnessed by President Putin during his visit to the Northern 
Fleet in advance of the election, prompted President Putin to issue a clear edict 
to the military to "stage a fresh attempt to put the matter right."(2) With naval 
commander Vladimir Kuroyedov embarked on a nearby ship to oversee events, 
the successful launches were a welcome sign. Naval obligations as they are to 
Russia’s nuclear triad, the launches were imperative to assuring the efficacy of 
the Navy’s ability to uphold its share of the nuclear panoply. This comes at a time 
when Russia has begun to flex its strategic/military might vis-à-vis the growing 
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NATO and United States presence in its "near abroad" within the Commonwealth 
of Independent States and in concert with Russia's mounting chagrin over 
continued development of the United States' missile defense system. 
 
In a recent interview with the Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer (Military-Industrial 
Courier) weekly, Navy Commander-in-Chief Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov 
avowed that "the naval component in the Russian strategic forces may exceed 
50 percent [and] this component has the top priority in Russia's strategic nuclear 
triad."(3) Shouldered by an antiquated submarine force, Russia’s nuclear triad 
will be burnished by a fourth-generation submarine, currently under production. 
The first of the class, Yuri Dolgoruki, will help bridge the technological chasm 
dividing the strategic missile submarine capabilities of Russia and the United 
States. 
 
Yet, with the pronouncements that the Navy will assume a greater role in the 
nuclear triad and the appearance of successful launches, the story does not end 
there. The Russian daily, Moskovksiy komsomolets has reported that the 
successful launches of 17 March were preceded by another launch failure; Olga 
Bozhyeva's article, relying on naval sources, accuses the Navy of suppressing 
official information and the accounts of the launches, as well as the reasons for 
not conducting the launches on time during a pre-arranged launch window for 
which it had notified the international community. 
 
Bozhyeva alleges that the Novomoskovsk was unable to launch the missile at the 
predetermined time of 1100 local leaving the Navy scrambling to rationalize the 
delays. She surmises that "officially it was stated that the launch had been 
postponed until 1500 hours. The fleet command imposed a strict ban on the 
release by its personnel of any information about the reasons for the 
postponement, and presented a choice of two official versions:  
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1) they had not had time to warn the Americans about the missile launches; and 
2) the 1100-hour setbackshould be considered a "simulated electronic" dress 
rehearsal." (4) 
 
In addition, Bozhyeva opines that a conspiracy might be at work if technical, 
human or simulation errors can't be verifiably proven. She claims that "from the 
very outset it was not in the interests of certain senior representatives of the 
Navy Main Staff for the launches of the RSM-54 to be successful. It so happens 
that they have major "commercial" interests in missile construction, where a 
desperate struggle is under way for money from the defense orders." (5) The 
crux of the assertion is that the Navy knowingly used a missile that had a history 
of documented technical problems. While this seems the least plausible reason 
for the miscues of February, it remains to be seen whether or not the technical 
faults (known or unknown) were central to the failures. 
 
All in all, the Navy's compass must be off because it's implausible that notification 
of the Americans or another "simulated electronic" exercise precluded the actual 
launch. The competency of the Navy was vested in the launches of 17 March. It's 
become increasingly clear that whatever the reason for the launches not 
occurring as scheduled, the Navy couldn't, in a simulated and operational test 
environment, fulfill its obligations to launch on time. This fact alone has dire 
ramifications to Russia's nuclear deterrence. Yet, Russia continues to develop 
"new strategic offensive weapons that will essentially render useless any missile 
defense systems" (6) according to General Baluyevsky, First Deputy Chief of 
Russian General Staff. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) INTERFAX, 17 Mar 04 via JRL #8124, 18 March 2004. 
(2) INTERFAX, 17 Mar 04 via JRL #8124 18 March 2004. 
(3) ITAR-TASS, 18 Mar 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis database. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
Ukraine 
Attack on the media 
Many argue that the Russian president was reelected by such a substantial 
margin because of his control of the Russian media. Other presidential 
candidates had very limited media time to "state their cases." Will the same 
happen in Ukraine? The chances of Kuchma being reelected (or even running) 
are small. Nonetheless, the media has already suffered a serious blow from the 
current authorities, whose ultimate goal is to leave some version of the present 
government in power after the current leaders leave the scene. 
 
Recently, a number of independent newspapers and radio stations have been 
shut down: Radio Liberty was removed from the air; Roks and Kontinent radio 
stations, which rebroadcast Radio Liberty, BBC, Deutsche Welle and Public 
radio, were eliminated; an opposition newspaper Silski Visti was closed. 
Presently, there are attempts to shut down the last opposition newspaper Ostrov 
(Donetsk region) and to deprive Channel 5, the only independent TV channel, of 
its license. (1) There also have been numerous attacks on Ukrainian journalists, 
allegedly, on the authorities' orders. Heorhiy Chechyk's death is the latest 
mystery. Chechyk was the director of YUTA television and radio company in 
Poltava. He was killed in a car accident right before talks began on the right to 
broadcast Radio Liberty. Heorhiy Gondaze and Ihor Oleksandrov are other 
alleged victims of Kuchma's regime. (2) 
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The crude attacks on media in the past month have triggered harsh reactions 
from journalists and political circles in Ukraine and abroad. An appeal in support 
of the independent press signed by approximately two million people from all 
regions of Ukraine has been turned over to the Constitutional Court. In addition, 
nearly 3,000 opposition supporters gathered in Kiev on Tuesday, March 9, 2004 
in protest against the threat to independent mass media. (3) Yushchenko, 
Tymoshenko and the Socialist Party adopted a resolution, which said: "Today, in 
independent Ukraine, the authorities are persecuting freedom of speech even 
more crudely than the tsarist secret police…The authorities feel fear and 
weakness when people stop being dependent on their manipulations and start 
taking their own balanced decisions." (4) 
 
Such an attack on media is undoubtedly timed to influence the October 2004 
presidential elections. The authorities are attempting to silence as many 
opposition voices as possible, as quickly as possible, with the ultimate goal of 
leaving some form of the current administration in power. There is a good chance 
that their efforts will be successful. In a county where neither the opposition nor 
the authorities enjoy overwhelming popularity, the victory is likely to go to those 
whose voice is heard the most. 
 
BELARUS 
Nationalization? 
Recently, the President Alyaksandr Lukashenko signed an edict that would allow 
the government to interfere in the decision-making of privatized companies if 
these companies face an "unfavorable economic situation," calling it "the golden 
share" clause. (7) In particular, should the government decide that the formerly 
state-owned enterprises are not doing their job (e.g. not paying wages to its 
employees or producing an unsatisfactory balance sheet), the government now 
has a right to alter a company's policy. Lukashenko also stated that "the 
government can interfere to protect employees' rights or the nation's economic 
interests and security." (8) 
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This edict is yet another blow to almost nonexistent freedom of enterprise in 
Belarus. Interfering with activities of private enterprises will mean hampering any 
rudiments of a market economy that might exist in Belarus. "Protecting 
employees" will mean limiting the employers in their ability to restructure their 
companies, which often involves letting the employees go and acquiring new 
technologies for the freed up resources. The practice is non sustainable in the 
long run. And if Lukashenko is sincere in his desire to "protect nation's [long run] 
economic interests and [economic] security, "he should allow the Belarussians to 
engage in free enterprise and provide them with adequate conditions to do so. It 
is not likely to happen, however, as sustaining a socialist way of running the 
economy and avoiding the struggles of transition is the only thing that keeps 
Lukashenko in power. And he is not about to give it up. 
 
BRSM members switch sides. 
Over 100 Belarussian students, previously enrolled in a youth organization 
BRSM, which supports President Lukashenko, have switched over to an illegal 
opposition youth movement Zubr, setting a precedent in Belarus. The students 
stated that they have closed the chapter of the pro-governmental organization in 
their institute in Baranovichy. (5) The authorities reacted immediately when the 
new members showed up at the university the next day wearing Zubr badges 
and distributing the newspaper Resistance among the students. The police 
detained around 20 new Zubr members, accusing them of illegal activities and 
changing them with violating Article 167-10 of the Code of Administrative 
Offences. An activist of Zubr Sergei Polishchuk was beaten by the police and 
questioned about the financial sources of the organization, locations of the 
newsletter printing facilities, and the names of Zubr leaders' in Barabovichy. (6) 
 
MOLDOVA 
A report published by the Federation of European Employers, an independent 
organization created in 1989 on the initiative of the European Commission, states 
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that Moldova has the lowest wages in Europe. To use the absolute numbers: one 
hour of labor in Denmark (which has the highest average salary in Europe) costs 
an employer on average 27,89 Euro, when in Moldova it costs him/her 0.32 Euro. 
Moldovan salary is only 1.14% of the Danish one. (9) The statistics do not come 
as a surprise given that Moldova is the poorest European country. 
 
Happy anniversary!? 
The month of March 2004 has marked the 12th anniversary of the Dniester war. 
Trans-Dniester was formally an autonomous area within Ukraine before 1940 
when the Soviet Union combined it with Bessarabia to form the Moldavian Soviet 
Socialist Republic. This area is mainly inhabited by Russian and Ukrainian 
speakers. (10) 
 
As the predominantly Slavic population of Trans-Dniester became increasingly 
worried about Moldova's closer ties with Romania, Trans-Dniester declared its 
independence from Moldova in September 1990. Fighting broke out in March 
1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, with hundreds dying before 
Russian "peacekeepers" were introduced in mid-1992. (11) Trans-Dniester is not 
recognized as a state by any country in the world and it has been plagued by 
lawlessness and corruption for more than a decade. 
 
The Trans-Dniester conflict directly contributes to the devastated economic 
situation in Moldova - the poorest country in Europe, where 80% of the 
population live below the poverty line. The conflict keeps away many potential 
foreign investors, whose capital could have substantially speeded up Moldova's 
transition to a functioning market economy. 
 
Russian troops are still stationed in the region despite Moscow's pledge to 
withdraw its soldiers from Trans-Dniester by 2002, a deadline that was extended 
to 2003 with the agreement of the OSCE pan-European security body, but also 
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has not been honored. (12) In November of 2003, President Voronin rejected the 
Russian project, which proposed an asymmetric federalization of Moldova. 
 
Europe and the United States clearly want complete elimination of Russia's 
military presence in the region. "The United States needs a clear Black Sea 
region," says Viktor Martynov, a prominent Tiraspol political scientist, "What does 
it need a military base near the Romanian Konstanza for? If enforcement of 
democracy on the world continues at Iraqi rate, then some filtration camps will 
certainly be required, and Moldova may become one. Russia is only an 
obstacle." (13) 
 
Russia, on the other hand, is determined to keep its presence in the region. It will 
be very hard to convince Moscow to leave when Moldova's neighbor, Romania, 
is due to join NATO this year and Ukraine has also expressed interest in 
becoming a member. 
 
With no compromise in sight, the conflict has the potential to last for decades – 
celebrating its 20th anniversary could be a sad reality. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
Azerbaijan 
Ilham Aliyev is trying to expand and diversify Azerbaijan’s energy sector by 
solidifying bilateral and trilateral relations with Azerbaijan’s neighbors. On 2 
March, Aliyev concluded a two-day visit to Kazakhstan in which the Azerbaijani 
leader had extensive discussions with top Kazakhstani officials, including 
President Nursultan Nazarbaev and Prime Minister Daniyal Akhmetov. (1) The 
meetings yielded a variety of cooperation agreements covering agriculture, 
aviation, defense, energy transport, trade and cultural exchanges, with energy 
cooperation dominating the Azeri agenda. (2) The Kazakh government, hesitant 
to annoy Moscow, nonetheless signaled commitment to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline. Aliyev gushed that Kazakh participation in the BTC project would 
meet both Kazakh and Azeri interest while bolstering regional security (3). While 
hailing the pipeline’s potential, Kazakhstani leaders remain reluctant to commit 
themselves fully to the project. 
 
Following the Azeri-Kazakh meeting, Baku hosted, on 16-17 March, the Deputy 
Foreign Ministers of the five Caspian littoral states (Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) for the 13th round of the Caspian Working 
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Group. (4) The 16-17 March Meeting marked the resumption of Caspian Talks, 
which were suspended two years earlier by Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over 
delineating their respective sectors of the Caspian. However, the Group did not 
accomplish much in resolving recurrent disputes and has many remaining 
obstacles to hurdle, as indicated by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mehdi 
Safari’s denouncing of the bilateral and trilateral agreements signed between 
Russia and Azerbaijan; between Russia and Kazakhstan and those among the 
three states delineating their respective sectors of the Caspian (5). Additionally, 
Safari restated Iran’s continued demands that the Caspian be demilitarized and 
divided into five equal parts, which would give Iran 20.4% (6). 
 
Georgia 
In 18 March, Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili announced an end to the 
economic blockage of Adjarian, which had been imposed since 14 March. This 
announcement came on the heels of direct negotiations between Georgian 
President Mikhail Saakashvili and Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze. The decision 
to isolate Adjarian economically followed an incident on 14 March, in which 
Adjarian border guards prevented Saakashvili’s motorcade from entering the 
region (7). In return for the lifting of the economic blockage, Abashidze 
acknowledged Tbilisi’s right to "impose control over customs, the port and all 
strategic offices," while promising to hold competitive elections in the 28 March 
parliamentary race. (8) In addition, Saakashvili will hold Abashidze responsible 
for disarming bands of recently-mobilized Adjarian citizens (9). A potential source 
of future tension between Tbilisi and Batumi will be Abashidze’s follow-through 
on allowing free March elections. However, pressure on Abashidze to hold a fair 
election is not coming solely from Tbilisi. Before the announced ending of the 
economic barrier, Council of Europe Secretary-General Walter Schwimmer 
telephoned Abashidze, urging the Adjarian leader to provide for an open 
campaign environment (10). 
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The United States and Russia were also involved in seeking a peaceful 
resolution to the tensions between Tbilisi and Batumi, establishing a pattern of 
West-East behavior via the South Caucasus. On 15 March, Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov arrived in Batumi with the personal endorsement of Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov in an offer to mediate the conflict. (11) The offer of 
mediation coincided with a meeting between Nino Burjanadze and Russian 
Ambassador Vladimir Chkhikvishvili and the resulting announcement that Russia 
would not interfere in Georgia’s domestic affairs and would maintain neutrality. 
(12) The indicated interest of the Russian government in Tbilisi-Batumi relations 
was matched by those of the United States. On 16 March, Ambassador Miles 
met with Saakashvili and Zhvania in Poti. (13) Ambassador Miles’ statements 
paralleled Chkhikvishvili’s in that the United States regarded Tbilisi-Batumi 
relations as internal matters, and would mediate to ease tensions between 
Saakashvili and Abashidze. (14) Miles’ statements follow those made three 
months prior by the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Lynn Pascoe, 
during a visit to Georgia, in which Pascoe stated that Adjaria was an internal 
matter for Georgia. (15) 
 
The Russian and American strategies and interests displayed during the recent 
tensions in Georgia are similar to those employed during the overthrow of 
Shevardnadze. The Russian and American behavior indicates the future pattern 
of Russian-American conduct in dealing with Southern Caucasus hot spots, as 
well as the joint Russian-American interest to maintain a status quo in the South 
Caucasus. 
 
Chechnya 
Pro-Moscow Chechen Administration head Ahmed Kadyrov has appointed 
Sergei Abramov, from the Auditing Chamber, to replace Anatoli Popov as Prime 
Minister of Chechnya (16). Abramov’s appointment and the replacement of 
General Kazantsev, former Presidential Envoy for the Southern federal district, 
with Vladimir Yakovlev, a former Putin aide, (17) indicate Putin’s efforts to 
 38 
centralize power and strengthen control over Chechnya. Popov was the head of 
federal state enterprise "Directorate for Construction and Restoration Works in 
Chechnya," which had been included in the State Construction Committee, and 
participated in the distribution of contracts for construction and restoration of 
different objects before his appointment as Chechen Prime Minister. (18) Popov 
was to supervise and allocate the financial flow from Moscow to Chechnya, but, 
as a 17 March Nezavisimaya gazeta highlights, Popov, contrary to Putin’s 
intentions, became too dependent on Kadyrov and didn't participate in housing 
affairs. (19) Popov’s dismissal has been expected since his 27 September 
poisoning incident and consequent treatment in Moscow’s Central Clinical 
Hospital. (20) During his protracted stay in Moscow, Popov was absent from 
some several meetings of the Auditing Chamber in October and November 2003, 
when the debate and subsequent allocations concerning the financing of 
Chechen housing projects were discussed. (21) Kadyrov has used Popov’s 
dismissal as an occasion to assign the former Chechen Prime Minister blame for 
the massive misallocation of housing funds and irregularities in Chechnya’s 
finances. (22) Questions, arise over Kadyrov’s allegations given that, in Popov’s 
absence, Kadyrov appointed Eli Isayev, finance minister of Chechnya and a 
close Kadyrov aide and dependent, to be acting Premier, and since Popov’s 
absence Isayev has been in control of the government (23). As per the Kremlin, 
Putin was worried that an Isayev-Kadyrov team would grow too independent and 
therefore forced the appointment of Sergei Abramov as Prime Minster. Sergei 
Abramov in linked to Moscow, as demonstrated by his previous jobs as chairman 
of Russia’s Auditing Chamber in Chechnya since 2003 and as Chechen Finance 
Minister from 2001- 2003. (24) He likely poses little threat relative to either Popov 
and Isayev. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Itar-Tass Moscow, 11 Mar; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) Ibid. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Border control in Tajikistan 
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Russian troops have maintained a presence along the Afghan-Tajik border since 
the late 19th century. On March 17, however, Lieutenant General Abdurahmon 
Azimov, head of the Tajik Border Committee, made a statement that Tajikistan 
was prepared to assume control of a 600 kilometer section of the eastern Pamir 
Afghan-Tajik border. This increased responsibility for the Tajik military does not 
mean that Russian forces will cease playing a role in monitoring the borders. On 
the contrary, Azimov made it clear that "the Russian presence may be 
represented by the institution of military advisers at all frontier posts and 
commandants’ offices… [and the number of advisers] may be quite large." (1) 
Close cooperation continues between the two militaries — with both Russian and 
Tajik forces recently collaborating in counterterrorism exercises (2) — while the 
focus has been towards shifting responsibility for border control to the Tajiks and 
at the same time trying set up a Russian base in the country. 
 
The most recent round of talks between Russian and Tajik officials about 
establishing a Russian military base in Tajikistan, however, has once again 
ended in failure. (3) In 1999, the presidents of Russia and Tajikistan agreed to 
the establishment of a Russian military base in Tajikistan, but they have regularly 
failed to reach consensus. (4) And while both sides say that they are close to an 
agreement, key points remain to be resolved. 
 
One reason is that Tajikistan is playing U.S. interests in the region of Russia’s 
desire to increase its hegemonic presence. The recent extradition of former Tajik 
Interior Minister Yoqub Salimov can be seen as an attempt by Russia to garner 
favor with the Tajik government. (5) The U.S. contributed $43 million in aid to 
Tajikistan for 2003 and it has been rumored by Nezavisimaya gazeta that the 
U.S. has offered to increase significantly their support to Tajikistan if the 
Russians are not allowed to establish a permanent military base in the country. 
(6) Of course these rumors are officially denied, but certainly the increased U.S. 
involvement in the region has given Tajikistan added leveraging power. 
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For the base to be established, Tajikistan has requested that Russia write off 
$300 million of Tajik debt, and grant Tajikistan control over the organization of 
the base. An unnamed source with the Russian Defense Ministry pragmatically 
commented on the Tajik demands: "We can write off a part of Tajikistan’s $300 
million debt to Russia, especially since Dushanbe is unable to pay off the entire 
debt anyway, and it can hardly count on financial assistance from the United 
States." (7) Going further, the source added: "Moscow has no intention of 
agreeing to Dushanbe’s claims to obtain the right to manage the movable 
property of the 201st division and other Russian units, as well as their real estate 
in the event of the Tajik leadership taking the decision that they should withdraw 
from the republic." (8) In other words, Russia is willing to grant Dushanbe some 
concessions, but ultimate control of the base remains with Russia. 
 
Anticipating that the situation will eventually be resolved and Russia will establish 
a military base in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan has been informed that the Russian 
base in Osh (in Southern Kyrgyzstan), will be transferred to Kyrgyz jurisdiction. 
(9) The base currently serves the Russian border troops stationed in Tajikistan 
and it is unlikely that such a transfer will occur until after the Russian base in 
Tajikistan is established. 
 
Update on media in Kazakhstan 
Updating the status of the media in Kazakhstan, (10) on 17 and 18 March the 
lower and upper houses of parliament, respectively, passed amendments to a bill 
that critics claim will further limit free speech. While the private media are 
relatively developed in Kazakhstan, approximately 80 percent is controlled by the 
family and friends of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The recent media 
bill has a number of groups, such as Reporters Without Borders, concerned that 
an arbitrary system of registration and ambiguously-defined restrictions will allow 
inappropriate manipulation of the media and diminish the necessary conditions 
for objective reporting. (11) 
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Already threats, beatings, and prison sentences for outspoken journalists foster 
an environment of self-censorship. There is a prevailing sense that the opposition 
media is unduly harassed, and the recent sentencing of Vladimir Mikhailov 
suggests political motives. Mikhailov, publisher of the independent weekly 
Diazapon and director of both Rifma media company and Arsenal publishing, 
was sentenced to a one year prison term for failing to implement a 2002 court 
order requiring him to reposition a load-bearing wall in a rental space which he 
owned. What is at issue is the disproportionate prison sentence, which is 
believed by some press freedom observers to be an attempt to curtail Diazapon's 
criticism of local and regional officials. (12) 
 
Role of Iran and China in the region 
While Russia and the U.S. are seen as the most active among the actors vying 
for hegemonic influence in Central Asia, Iran and China have made steps 
towards improving relations within the region. Iranian President Mohammad 
Khatami met with Abdygany Erkebayev, Kyrgyz Chairman of the Legislative 
Assembly, where the mutual desire to expand relations and implement existing 
agreements was expressed. (13) Tehran called on Uzbekistan to increase the 
transit of goods between the two countries via the Bafq-Mashhad railway line, 
scheduled to open within the next few months. (14) Khatami further reached out 
to Tajikistan, expressing a desire to expand cooperation between the two 
countries (15) and Iran has agreed to help Tajikistan complete the construction of 
the 670 million watt hydraulic power plant in Sangtudeh. (16) 
 
On 25 May, China and Tajikistan plan to open the first border trading port 
between the two countries. The Kalasu Port will allow direct trade and travel 
between the two countries (though the border will be closed to third country 
nationals), thereby decreasing the transit cost of products that had been 
transported through a third country. (17) Kazakhstan is also hoping to tap into the 
Chinese trade market with plans to construct a new railway that would more 
efficiently connect China and Europe. (18) And in the later half of 2004, 
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Kazakhstan will begin the construction of the Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline which 
will transport oil from the center of Kazakhstan to the Chinese border. (19) 
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